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encounter with China:  
Challenging one’s own presuppositions
Interview with Henry Rosemont, Jr.
Vytis Silius. During your stay in Vilnius, I have heard that you have so many invitations 
to give lectures and deliver speeches at conferences in the United States and abroad 
that you have to decline many of those. What made you to accept the invitation from the 
Centre of Oriental Studies at Vilnius University? And how do you feel about your choice 
to come here now, as your visit is slowly coming to an end?
Henry Rosemont, Jr. Well, a number of things combined. First was a meeting 
with loreta at the academie du Midi conference last year and her friend Geir 
Sigurdsson―now moving to the University of tallinn―both of whom said they would 
like to have me come to their campuses for lectures and provide some consultations 
for developing Asian studies programs at their institutions. 
i am always pleased to assist in the development of academic programs dealing 
with asia, as you know, because we are now at a point in the world where we must 
seriously entertain the idea that we must not only learn about the other, but from the 
other as well. Moreover, neither my wife Joann nor i had ever been to either country, 
so of course i accepted the invitation to come if the arrangements could be made. 
Happily they were, and we are very glad for we have already come to be very fond of 
the lithuania we have seen so far―the countryside, the old city, the university, and 
the people―and we are looking forward to enjoying iceland as well.
V.S. Why should scholars study Chinese thought? What is it that is relevant to 
peoples with such different cultural backgrounds as in Iceland, Lithuania, the United 
States, and China?
H.R. although lithuanian, icelandic, and american cultures are different, they 
share a number of assumptions and presuppositions. all three are strongly influenced 
by the Judeo-Christian and ancient Greek religious and philosophical heritages. of 
course China is very different from those, and therefore i have always seen China as an 
extremely useful intellectual tool for the education of young people, because it forces 
you to confront a way of life that is different from what you are accustomed to in a 
very basic way. You don’t just challenge the view; you challenge the presuppositions 
on which the view is based. and in that way, the more you look through the window 
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of another culture, the more it eventually becomes a mirror of your own, and you are 
able to see your own cultural presuppositions in a way that you could never see them 
before. 
For example, if you are a philosophy student, you will become very interested in 
the mind–body problem, especially since it was modelled by Descartes: how do you 
link the mind, which has no extension, with the body, which does? You see much of 
the history of modern Western philosophy devoted to trying to solve the mind-body 
problem. only when you go to a place like China can you come to see that the problem 
is not a universal one, but unique to the heritage and the grammars of the languages of 
Western civilization. there is a different vocabulary employed by the Chinese, who 
simply don’t see us as having minds that are distinct from a body. 
that is very humbling, because it of course suggests that the mind–body problem 
is not a universal philosophical problem. it is unique to indo-european languages 
in the West. in that way, one has an idea that you can think about the mind–body 
problem and then see why it’s maybe not really a problem. this is a very difficult 
insight to obtain if you just stay within the Western tradition. 
V.S. Is it possible for people from different traditions to actually overcome those 
presuppositions that you just talked about? Is it possible for me, a European who is 
trained in the Western tradition, not merely cognitively to acknowledge these differences, 
but really to extend my mind in order to take a view of Chinese as at least a part of 
my own worldview? Is it not that I as an European more often divide myself into the 
scholar, who is interested in Chinese thought and merely cognitively recognizes those 
differences, but as a person does not take them deeper into my personality?
H.R. i believe i have imbibed a little bit of the chinese perspective and do not 
think i am particularly unusual in having done so. Of course i remain deeply steeped 
in my own cultural heritage, and always will. i don’t think you can get rid of your 
entire cultural perspective—nor should you want to―but you can certainly call much 
of it into question utilizing the material from other cultures, especially the seamier 
sides of one’s own. that in itself is liberating. once you see that you are a product 
of your cultural tradition, you have gone a long way toward overcoming it and being 
restrained in it. And it becomes possible to learn to begin looking for alternatives. 
it is also important to note that when Chinese come to the West we certainly expect 
them to be able to drop their Chinese ways and become Westerners; why can’t we do 
the same? and i think a number of people do go both ways. there is an understanding. 
that is one reason we do Chinese studies in our universities―to make it easier for 
people who go to China to feel more comfortable there. 
Can we ever really think like someone else? i am not sure. But we can go a long 
way. there used to be expression―‛going asiatic’, for some of the old missionaries, 
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some of the old traders, and so on. they fell in love completely with China; they were 
wearing Chinese clothes, spoke Chinese all the time, ate just Chinese food, and they 
seemed to become almost Chinese. For instance, one of the most famous of the Jesuit 
missionaries, Matteo ricci, supposedly could write Chinese so well that no Chinese 
could tell that he wasn’t a Confucian scholar. 
at the same time, he never forgot that he was a Jesuit going there to convert the 
elite Confucians. How much he was a Chinese? i don’t know. it’s a good question, and 
i say probably we never leave all of our cultural tradition behind. But i am not sure 
that would be a good thing to do anyway. 
Loreta Poškaitė. I would like to ask you a little bit similar question. As a translator 
of some Chinese canonical texts, first of all of lunyu 论语, I want to ask you about this 
search for some common philosophical language, especially about the translation of 
Chinese concepts into Western languages. As far as I know, the problem of translation 
and true understanding was raised within the work of the Jesuits in China. Then it was 
raised again in the East-West comparative conferences in Honolulu. So it is a lasting 
problem. Do you see any changes in it? What has changed with this problem? Or do you 
think that this problem has transformed into some other aspects? 
H.R. As scholarship on china has increased over the last 150 years, it became 
clearer just how many presuppositions the early translators brought to bear on the 
works they studied, not least the justly admired late 19th century translator James 
legge. He was wonderful, but clearly he was looking for what looks like God, or 
what looks like an immortal soul, what looks like Heaven in Chinese writings, 
because those are the metaphysics and theology of the Judeo-christian tradition. We 
don’t do that today, but it doesn’t mean we see the Chinese as they ‛really are’. But 
i think we are getting more comfortable with the fact that there is a unique set of 
philosophical terms in Chinese that don’t match exactly what i call the concept cluster 
of contemporary Western thought.
So for me, as for roger ames with whom i translated the Lunyu, it is essential 
to provide a lexicon, a kind of gloss on 15 or 20 key Chinese terms that are found 
in these translations. in order to understand the assumptions and presuppositions of 
other cultures, especially in philosophy or in ethics, you have to see the kind of basic 
terms that are used in moral discourse. For example, we do have the terms morals and 
ethics―now i’m talking about english―there are a bunch of other concepts that go 
in there: choice, freedom, liberty, dilemma, subjective, objective, right, wrong, good, 
evil, rational―none of which appear in classical Chinese. 
in the same way, the terms for the West don’t apply to ancient Greece either. the 
key term for aristotle was not morals; it was arête―virtue, or better, excellences. And 
he had other words like phronesis, akrasia, logos, and so on. that’s the cluster you 
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need in order to understand Greek philosophy. in the medieval West, it was honour 
that was the key term, linking others like chivalryy, vilein, soke, sake, shent, boon, 
troth―all those words had meaning. You know the expression for goodness sake. 
What is this sake? in the medieval, it had a very definite meaning. Soke and sake were 
different: sake was something that you owed to the other, and soke was something he 
owed to you. if you read The Canterbury Tales, you will see those words, and that’s 
how they evaluated conduct. 
let us take a look at india―moksha is there the key term, and karma, dharma, 
samsara, nirvana―you need those terms if you want to discuss ethics in india. it is 
not surprising, because every culture, and sometimes the same culture in different 
periods of time, has its concepts that are basic to any discussion of human conduct.
What i try to do in my work, is to take ren 仁, shu 恕, xiao 孝, xin 心, dao 道, and 
de 德―those terms―and show how they link together for the Chinese to discuss how 
to describe, analyze, and evaluate human conduct. it is a different set of concepts. in 
Sanskrit nobody would think of translating dharma or karma anymore, we just have 
to learn to use those words. a problem with the Chinese is, so many of them are 
spelled the same way. How many zhi’s, si’s, xin’s are there? it makes it a little bit more 
difficult, which makes all the more reason for the need of the gloss. 
in roger Ames’s and my translation of Lunyu the only term we glossed was tian 
天, because we really don’t like the word Heaven for tian, because you just cannot get 
Heaven, especially with a capital H, without thinking of Christianity or egypt. there 
is a causal sequence to Heaven. Tian can mean nature, and other times it means the 
starry heaven, Himmel. We shouldn’t have translated ren either. We should have left 
that one in our translitertion too. 
that is the way, i think, the future translations will go, until we get the key set of 
concepts that we can understand the Chinese with. You need the gloss, for example 
for li 礼, you need it for yi義. You can’t just say reverence or appropriateness; you 
can’t say simply ritual, or worship, manners, polite, civil, rites, because it contains 
all of those things. How do you convey the meaning of yi? You can describe that it’s 
hallowed preparing the animal for slaughter: the character contains a sheep 羊 and 
a hand 手 holding an axe 戈. so it’s the attempt to purify oneself in preparing for 
sacrifice. i think it has to be known in there, because the word that we end up in our 
translation is appropriate for yi. You always do what’s appropriate, not what’s just 
righteous, because that, of course, reminds us of the Bible, or at least it does for us. 
the righteous, the true, the correct―they suggest the absolute right. Whereas 
appropriate suggests appropriate communication for the context, and that what’s 
necessary for the Chinese. So perhaps translators in 100 years from now will see us 
in the same way we see the missionaries of 100 years ago, i don’t know. But right now 
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this seems to me the best way to go―to do a gloss of fifteen or twenty terms and then 
proceed with the translations from there and maybe only transliterate a few of them. 
if you look at the translations that roger and i did, you will see we always include the 
key Chinese term when we put it in english, and it is there all the time, so everybody 
who knows Chinese can see exactly what we’re doing all the time. a lot of people 
have said that was very useful for them. that’s a short answer to your question. 
V.S. As a translator, when you leave some term not translated in the text, the way you 
did with tian, do you consider it the loss of the translator that he wasn’t able to translate 
it into his own language? Or maybe it has to be done with some terms in order not to 
impose any external meaning on them?
H.R. Some people say that is just the lazy way out. in some sense, i have some 
sympathy for that, because english obviously is very rich, stretchable language. even 
a word like stretchable is stretching english a little bit. But on the other hand, i think 
it is imperative that some people just come to terms with those Chinese terms, in the 
same sense as people have to come to terms with the concepts of karma or dharma. 
there is no other way of translating them. 
V.S. Or also terms like ethics, which is neither genuinely English, nor Lithuanian. 
H.R. right, ethos originally did not mean what it means today either, it meant 
something different. or let’s say mores, from which we get morals, also meant 
something like customs of the tribe. i came upon this when i was trying to figure 
out what word translates as morals in chinese. some people used yi, some people 
used li…
L.P. also de… 
H.R. that’s right. But none of those really work. other people would say to 
me: you can’t have a word-for-word translation; you should just look for the closest 
approximation and then go on. But it’s not just the term or concept morals that i 
argue is not in the texts. there are no close approximations in ancient Chinese for 
freedom or liberty. there is not even a clear analogy for ought or choice. remember 
Fingarette’s major claim. it really surprised me when i first read it. He talks about 
the concept of choice. Given that the Chinese use the notion of the path, the road, the 
Dao, you would surely think about the concept of a dilemma, the clear metaphor for 
choice being a fork in a road or a crossroad. Now, there is a word xing 行, meaning 
crossroads, and the ancient form of writing the graph is exactly a crossroads; yet no 
chinese ever used the metaphor of a crossroad to talk about choice or dilemmas. 
there is only the Way and the ditch, that’s all. either you follow the Way, commit 
yourself to it, or you fall by the wayside and become the xiaoren 小人. 
that’s really important to me, because it suggests that learning ethics, learning 
the Confucian way of life, does not solely involve pure rationality for what we would 
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consider making choices. So it is not simply that there is no word for morals; there 
is no close approximation for any of the words that are necessary for us to talk about 
moral problems in contemporary english. i suspect in lithuanian you have words 
that are a lot like right and wrong, choice and ought, but then you have some that are 
unique ones, i assume. So for understanding the moral theories or moral views of 
lithuanians, we would require glosses of those terms for which there is no precise 
rendering into english. 
that is a very good way to learn about other cultures in my opinion. What their 
concepts are like―the concept clusters. that is why i came up with that particular 
term. You don’t just look for the key word―morals or arête―you look for all the 
related terms or concepts that fall under it as well. then you are coming to terms with 
understanding the other culture. 
L.P. What were the main difficulties while translating lunyu and Xiaojing 孝经? 
H.R. First of all, it was a delight to work with roger ames, because he is a splendid 
scholar and fellow philosopher, careful, playful and easy to collaborate with. even on 
those rare occasions when our views were far apart on some issue, our egos never 
got in the way of their resolution. We’ve done four things together now, two articles 
and two books, and more is in the offing. We usually divide the labour: i do the heavy 
lifting for some parts and he does so for the others. then we just swap our labour 
back and forth and refine each other’s work until we’re both happy with the way the 
material comes together. 
What causes the most difficulty? i would say sophisticating the introduction to 
our translation, if that’s what we are doing. the text itself, especially the Xiaojing, 
is actually a fairly simple and straightforward text. Most children in classical and 
imperial China who learned to read knew the Xiaojing before they were 10 years old, 
right after the San zi jing, and the Qian jing, the Thousand Character Classic. there 
are only 480 + different characters in the whole text. occasionally, the two of us had 
to tussle for a word. You know the word cai 才—for example in san cai 三才from 
chapter 7 in the Xiaojing. What word should be used for it? three talents? in the end, 
we did use talents in our translation. 
We also decided not to call the Xiaojing the Classic of Filial Piety, but rather the 
Chinese Classic of Familial Reverence. We did that because every time we mention 
piety to a student they tend to think of something christian, like the pious christian. 
it is not what the term means in the Chinese sense. Reverence for family things we 
think comes closer to what xiao means than piety does. You can’t easily divorce the 
word piety from its christian connotations in contemporary english, i think. Happily 
roger and i almost always share highly similar intuitions about our native language 
for purposes of translation from the chinese, all the more remarkable for him having 
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grown up in the Canadian far west (British Columbia) while i was raised in the US 
Midwest (Chicago). 
thus, refining the introduction, deciding what to put in and what to put in the 
glossary was important and caused the most difficulties. We did not want the glossary 
so long that people would get bored before they got to the end of it. on the other hand, 
we wanted to put in enough terms so readers could understand that when talking 
about loyalty to one’s parents, for example, it is not merely unquestioning obedience 
to everything parents ever say or do. Working collaboratively, in sum, is a splendid 
way of conducting scholarship, in my view, and it is also thoroughly enjoyable when 
you are working with someone you both respect and like.
L.P. And it is also a very Chinese way of working. 
H.R. Oh, yes. 
L.P. You have also translated Liebniz’s works on China, so I think you are interested 
in the perception of China in the West. I would therefore like to ask about the status 
of Confucianism as a world religion today. In the 70s and 80s of the last century 
there were many interpreters of Confucianism, for example Tu Weiming, who wanted 
to present Confucianism as a world religion. What has changed in the interpretation of 
Confucianism as a world religion in the 21st century? 
H.R. that is hard to answer, because my own view of the Confucians has always 
been somewhat different from tu Weiming’s and others, as much as i respect his 
perspective. there are certain things about Confucianism that i can say, however, that 
would be hard for tu Weiming to say because i am not a Chinese while tu is. You 
have heard in my talks or read in my articles how i consistently and sharply criticize 
my own government from a classical Confucian perspective. tu Weiming cannot 
easily do that, because there would be a lot of people who would get mad and tell him 
he should go back where he came from, which they could not say to me in the same 
way. 
At the same time, there is much that tu Weiming can say to a chinese audience 
that they would pay closer attention to than they would to me―even if we were to say 
the same things. i think, however, that on many issues there is a growing agreement 
among scholars that Confucianism is not just conservative, reactionary, and something 
that we ought to put out to the past. there are still a lot of people who want to use the 
facts of Chinese history as a way of putting down Confucianism, which strikes me 
as silly. there are a lot of good reasons for questioning Christianity. But just as the 
crusades, the inquisition, or the thirty Year’s War should not make you stop being 
a christian, neither should the many sorry facts of chinese imperial history cause 
one to not take Confucianism seriously―especially when it can be seen that most of 
those sorry facts are unequivocally condemned in the classical writings. 
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For myself, there are several key reasons for pressing the Confucian case. First, 
i think the confucian vision does hit very closely a number of our intuitions about 
who we are as human beings, how we define ourselves in relation to others. i think it 
accords perhaps even more closely with our intuitions of what it is to be a human than 
anything current in the West, especially in my homeland, the u.s.A. 
two, i believe Confucianism is an authentic spiritual tradition, but one that 
requires no theological beliefs. You don’t have to accept any theology, for example 
that Confucius walked on water, that Moses received instructions directly from God, 
or that he parted the red sea. You don’t have to accept the theology of Allah providing 
in Heaven, or devas in Hinduism. Buddhism is a little different, but even there you 
must accept the notion of karma, anatman, moksha, and the like in order to fully 
appreciate Buddhist theology and philosophy and psychology. confucianism requires 
no beliefs of that nature.
Still a third reason is that it does provide a way for finding meaning, dignity, and 
contentment in this life, not in some transcendental realm.
And a fourth reason that i press the confucian persuasion is that if you are a pious 
Christian, or a good Jew, a good Muslim, a good Hindu, you can still learn things from 
Confucianism without having to give up your adherence to the other faith tradition. 
it is not either/or. 
to sum this up, i think it is time to go beyond thinking it is merely important 
to learn about Confucianism or about China. What i try to press is that it is now 
necessary to entertain seriously the possibility that we may have important things to 
learn from china and from confucianism. Of course nobody denies that there are a 
lot of things that have to be learned about China, but my emphasis is now different: 
there are things we should be learning from them―especially from the authors and 
editors of the classical canon. 
V.S. I think in order to be able to learn from someone, from some culture, one 
has to find some basis, some foundation where you would find that other culture 
somewhat close to you. You said that the Confucian way of thinking sometimes hits 
our understanding and our intuitions about the world and human beings very closely. 
Thus my question would be this: where should we look for that common basis, common 
foundation that would unite Christian and Confucian ways? Being individual human 
beings, where do we have to start from in order to be able to investigate what differences 
those different cultural milieus produce in us?
H.R. two things stand out, although there are others as well. one thing 
shared, for example, between Christians―especially roman Catholic and eastern 
orthodox―and most Jewish believers and appropriately pious Muslims, is the 
importance of ritual, tradition and history. everyone should be able to resonate with 
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rituals that are performed in the observances of these religious activities. Another 
commonality is the roles that people live (i don’t like the verb play in this context), 
no matter how distinctive, every culture has the idea of sons or daughters. the same 
holds for the concept of parents, grandparents, teachers, friends, and more. those 
roles have cross-cultural applicability, and hence might serve well as a foundation for 
a new kind of ethical cross-cultural dialogue.
the Confucian persuasion, i think, provides insights into those roles, what may 
approximate what i call homoversals, because i don’t want to use the term universal. 
that again comes from some of my chomskyan training in generative linguistics. 
What i mean by homoversal is that ‛for all human beings, mentally and physically 
constituted as they are’. i am not seeking universals―which supposedly will hold 
‛throughout the universe’―but want to concentrate on the human condition solely, 
seeking ethical commonalities. the way one expresses reverence or affection for 
grandparents, the way one is as a friend, the way teachers and students interact, and 
particular kinds of rituals and traditions people have, of course, are what make each 
culture unique. But there are no tradition-less or ritual-less cultures. And there are 
no cultures without sons and daughters, mothers and fathers, and grandparents, and 
friends, and teachers, at least those categories, if not others. 
V.S. Maybe then Confucianism is that common ground where different cultures can 
meet?
H.R. one of reasons why i press the Confucian persuasion as hard and as 
consistently as i do is because i do think that it has a major contribution to make to 
enhancing dialogue that is truly cross-cultural. there is not enough of that yet. too 
much ostensibly cross-cultural dialogue has simply been the West lecturing to the 
rest of the world about what kind of lives all people should aspire to achieving, based 
largely on concepts of civil rights, abstract law, and people as models solely of homo 
economicus. perhaps re-grounding the idea of interacting with each other in terms 
of family, clan, place and time can assist us in keeping what is good and valuable in 
the concepts of law, rights, and economics while excising those aspects which are 
bringing the contemporary world ever closer to disaster. 
V.S. When people agree with universalities in ethics or moral philosophy, they do it 
because they believe, or at least want to believe, that universal law is a way to overcome 
the powerful ones. If there is a universal law, it obviously applies to the powerful 
ones too. Your way of looking at the Confucian moral system avoids talking about 
universalities. It instead acknowledges particularities. What then in the Confucian 
moral view prevents the strong ones from becoming plain immoralists and putting it as 
Trasymachus did, saying that justice is the justice of the stronger ones?
H.R. Clearly, Confucius himself saw the law as inappropriate as a way of educating 
people and having them be productive members of society. He wanted to do away with 
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cases. He thought the idea of ruling by administrative law and punishments was not 
a way for human beings to interact with each other. and i think there is a good deal 
of justification for this very deep suspicion, because the system of law tends to keep 
whatever stability and order that you have at present. and if what you have at present 
is a good deal of social injustice and inequality, than the law maintains the inequality 
and the injustice. take a quick example about free speech: both Bill Gates and i can 
take out a full page ad in a newspaper to express our opinion on some matter. But 
there is a difference. Gates pays for his ad out of the petty cash in his pocket, while i 
have to sell my house to pay for mine. it is not equal and can’t be under the present 
system. 
also, when you don’t have the thought of law and punishment quite as prominent, 
people have to rely more on their ability to persuade others rather than command 
them. it is the law, says the policeman. He has a gun and can shoot you if you don’t 
do what he says. the judge is the one who tells you are you going to jail. at times the 
law is a good thing, and obviously we need some laws. But if the only way to think 
about people behaving decently is by being threatened with punishment, i don’t think 
you are going to achieve a good society that way, and i believe history, east and West, 
shows this to be largely true. 
So if you combine the fact that the law tends to protect the rich and it is being 
extended as the rich get richer and wealth is being concentrated in fewer hands, then, 
again, i believe we may profit from entertaining the Confucian vision. 
We are moving from the philosophical toward the political level now. if someone 
says i will tax the rich if elected, very, very few of the rich will give him or her any 
campaign money to run for office. the magnitude of the extent to which money drives 
elections in supposedly democratic nations like the united states especially, is almost 
beyond comprehension for people who live in small countries. a little news article 
says that television and radio ads are going to exceed 100 million dollars each, just 
for primary elections. that is before the real election. and where do you get that 
kind of money except from the very wealthy? Now if five of us spend 2,000 dollars 
each to have breakfast with a candidate, we can tell him our concerns, and he will 
have 10,000 dollars for his next ad. How do we get that candidate to listen to us, if 
we have 5 dollars each for things like that? at all times while i am trying hard to be 
a philosopher, i am always also keenly aware that i am an american. and america 
is responsible for so much mischief in this world. So i am always trying to combine 
philosophy with a little bit of politics. 
the ultimate answer philosophically to your question is that―going back to 
the hierarchy―there is hierarchy even with friends. even though i am a teacher 
and you are a student, if we are out in the street, you become the benefactor and i 
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the beneficiary, because you know this wonderful city and i don’t, and i don’t speak 
lithuanian and you do. Now, if we are talking about reading Chinese texts―i am 
a benefactor and you are the beneficiary. Ultimately though, it is also a religious 
matter. if i exercise authority in authoritarian ways, if i diminish you when i am in 
a benefactor position, then i will not make any religious or spiritual progress at all 
according to Confucianism. that is why i say one has to see Confucianism ultimately 
as a spiritual discipline: the notion of self-cultivation―it is not just moral, it is also 
religious. You can see it most clearly in Mencius: i have not only the responsibility 
to help you, but i have a responsibility to myself to come to enjoy helping you. that 
is the development that takes place first with my own children, then with others, 
expanding all the time. this is in the end neither moral nor political, but spiritual. 
V.S. Is it being ultimately in the world and being connected to the world?
H.R. Yes. and through rituals connected to the past world, too. and by handing 
on the rituals to our beneficiaries we are connected to the future, too. 
V.S. To finish this interview, I am always inspired by the people whom I call my 
teachers, when I have the chance and luck to talk with them or to read their works. 
Could you tell us about your teachers, your sources of inspiration that keep you doing 
what you have been doing so long and so successfully?
H.R. of my Chinese teachers, there would be three names: the first one would be 
robert Crawford, my first teacher of things Chinese. My first systematic acquaintance 
with Chinese history came from him. My Chinese philosophy teacher was Vincent 
Shi―Shi Youzhong was his Chinese name. My major mentor was Helmut Wilhelm, 
the son of richard Wilhelm, translator of the Yijing and a major Yijing scholar 
himself. i have also profited from having the noted philosopher/scholar of religion 
Huston smith as my close friend for many years. But certainly my greatest inspiration 
philosophically, intellectually, and politically overall has been Noam Chomsky, when 
i had the great good fortune to spend 2 years of post-doctoral studies and research 
in linguistics and philosophy with him at Mit. He has been the greatest intellectual 
and moral influence on my academic life, in the way i think of what it means to be a 
human being, the proper conduct of research, politics, what a decent society should 
be like, and more. He has been a great inspiration for me ever since we first met in 
1968. 
5 October 2007, Vilnius
